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Abstract
We investigate the gender wage gap in top corporate jobs for the years 2000 till
2004. Using data from the OSIRIS database, we ¯nd that female managers receive
24.0 percent less in total compensation (salary, bonuses, other payments and exer-
cised stock options) than their male colleagues. When we control for personal, ¯rm
and industry characteristics, this di®erence reduces to 15.9 percent. Controlling for
occupational segregation, i.e. \glass ceiling", reduces the di®erence to 6.0 percent.
Additional results that fully consider the role of stock option indicate a 9.0 to 12.1
percent di®erence. These results suggest that the main sources of the gender wage
gap in top corporate jobs are occupational segregation and a di®erent endowment
of male and female managers with stock options.
Keywords: Gender wage gap, managerial compensation
JEL Classi¯cations: J31, G3
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A major development in the US labor market over the last decades has been the increased
labor force participation of women. In 1970, their participation rate was 43 percent; in
2004, it was 59 percent. Women also surged ahead into higher paying occupations. In
2004, half of all management, professional, and related occupations were held by women.
Women's earnings relative to men's also have risen. From 1979 to 2004, women's earnings
as a percent of men's increased from 62 to 80 percent (US Department of Labor, 2005).
However, compared to women in other countries the situation of US women is less favor-
able. Wider pay di®erentials between high and low paid work have induced a relatively
large gender gap compared to other countries (Blau and Kahn, 2000).
A large number of studies since the early 1970s report sizeable although over time
decreasing male-female wage di®erentials across and within occupations.1;2 While un-
observed characteristics of occupations may account for some fraction of the observed
gender pay gap, sizeable pay di®erences have also been reported in studies that look at
the male-female pay gap within narrowly de¯ned occupations that typically pay higher
wages.3
The movement of women into the labor force and into higher paying occupations has
1See Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) or Stanley and Jarrell (1998) for a meta-analysis of
gender wage gap studies. See Altonji and Black(1999) for a survey on sex and race discrimination.
2Employer-employee based studies, for example, show that a sizable fraction of the gender gap can
be attributed to segregation in lower paid occupations but a substantial part of the wage gap is still
attributable to the individual's sex (Bayard, Hellerstein, Neumann and Troske, 1999).
3For example, Wood, Corcoran, and Courant (1993) report gender pay di®erences among lawyers,
Morgan (1998) for engineers, Gunderson (1975) for narrowly de¯ned occupations within establishments,
Chauvin and Ash (1994) for business school graduates and Baker (1996) for experienced physicians.
A relatively large number of papers document male-female di®erences in wages of university faculty
(Barbezat, 1987, Barbezat and Hughes, 1990, Ferber and Green, 1982, Sigelman, Milward and Shepard,
1982, McNabb and Wass, 1997, and Gander, 1997). There is also some work that reports signi¯cant
di®erences for top managers of nonpro¯t organizations (Hallock, 2002).
1been less impressive at the very top of the corporate pyramid. Twenty years after the term
\glass ceiling" was coined by the Wall Street Journal to describe the arti¯cial barriers that
prevent women (and minorities) from reaching the top of the corporate hierarchy, women
still only account for less than 8 percent of the top managers in the USA (Economist,
2005).4
While the paucity of women in top corporate jobs has been documented quite exten-
sively, there are only a few academic studies on pay di®erences between men and women in
these jobs. A notable exception is a recent study by Bertrand and Hallock (2001), which
analyzes the compensation levels of the top ¯ve executives of large US companies for the
years 1992-1998 and reports a gender pay gap of 44 percent in the raw data. However,
after controlling for personal, occupational, ¯rm, and industry characteristics, they report
an insigni¯cant gap of about 4 percent.5
However, as Murphy (1999) shows, the 1992-1997 period has been somewhat of an
outlier in the sense that the total realized pay of top executives increased at an unprece-
dented pace over this period (see Figure 1). In addition, there has been a striking change
in the structure of executive compensation packages received by top managers. Whereas
salary made up 38 percent of the median CEO's total compensation in manufacturing and
mining industries in 1992, this fraction fell to 27 percent in 1996. The decrease was even
more dramatic in ¯nancial services with a drop from 35 to 21 percent. While bonus and
other payments remained essentially constant, this drop in base salary was accompanied
by a huge increase in the fraction of compensation based on stock options. There is now
some evidence that this trend has stopped in 2001 and somewhat reversed afterwards
4Catalyst (2005), using a di®erent way of de¯ning corporate o±cers, reports that women held 16.4
percent of all corporate o±cer positions in 2005, up just 0.7 percentage points from 2002. At the estimated
growth trend for the past ten years (0.82 percentage points per year), it will take 40 years for women to
reach parity with men in corporate o±cer ranks.
5See also Gregg and Machin (1994), who report a 20-30% pay gap for executives in the United
Kingdom.
2(Economist, 2006).
The objectives of our paper are twofold. We ¯rst analyze the gender pay gap in top
executive jobs for the years 2000-2004, a period over which the structure of compensation
packages in the US is di®erent from the 1992-1997 period. Over the 2000-2004 period, we
do not observe the same tremendous increase in total pay as was the case between 1992
and 1997. Second, we have a closer look on the contribution of the use of stock options on
the gender wage gap. Not only, that their relative importance in executive payment has
increased, but also { to our knowledge { no one has particularly investigated the gender
speci¯c aspects of the use of stock options yet.
Similar to Bertrand and Hallock (2001), our ¯ndings suggest that female executives
are paid a signi¯cant 6 percent less than their male colleagues after controlling for a rich
set of personal, occupational and ¯rm speci¯c characteristics. Our results show, that one
important source of the gender wage gap is occupational segregation. Another important
source are stock options. Additional estimation results show, that the pay di®erence
between male and female managers is dramatically higher, reaching a signi¯cant 14.9
percent, for the subsample of managers who exercised their stock options. The main
reason for the latter di®erence is that female managers obtain signi¯cantly less stock
options than male managers.
2 Data, variables and summary statistics
2.1 The OSIRIS database
The data used for this study come from the OSIRIS database from Bureau van Dyck.
OSIRIS contains information on compensation for top executive o±cers of publicly listed
US companies. The raw data include some 29,000 top executive o±cers from a total of
33643 companies. There is also information on the name, title, education, age and tenure
of these managers, and on ¯rm characteristics such as sales, assets, employees and market-
to-book ratio. To collect some missing data on ¯rm characteristics, we also employ the
Standard and Poors' Compustat Global database. About 90 percent of the companies
in our sample have ¯ve or more executives with complete data. About 65 percent of
the companies have more than ten and less than 15 executives with complete data. The
period covered by OSIRIS is 1998-2004. We restrict our analysis to the years 2000-2004
because there are too many missing observations for the ¯rst two years. The structure of
our data is that of an unbalanced panel with some individuals being in the sample only
once and others being in the sample up to ¯ve times.
2.2 Variables and their construction
To assess the gender gap, we construct a variable measuring compensation and various
other variables de¯ning gender, ¯rm size, occupation, and human capital variables re°ect-
ing the education and experience of the executives in our sample.
The following compensation categories are reported: (1) salary, (2) bonus, (3) other
annual payments, and (4) detailed data on stock options.6 We add salary, bonus, other
annual payments and the value of exercised stock options to obtain our basic measure of
total compensation. This measure does not include unexercised and unexercisable stock
6There are three pieces of information on the value of stock options. They come from the proxy
statements (Def 14A) and are de¯ned as follows. (1) The realized value from exercised stock options:
This variable shows the aggregate gain in pre-tax value realized from the exercise of stock options in the
last ¯scal year. (2) The value of unexercised in-the-money options at ¯scal year end: This variable shows
the value of exercisable stock options at the time of the proxy statement. This value equals the market
value of common stock at the reporting date, less the exercise price, times the number of stock option
shares outstanding. (3) The value of unexercisable options: This variable is again based on the closing
price of the underlying securities on the date of reporting minus the exercise price of the options, times
the number of stock options outstanding.
4options as part of total compensation, and it only re°ects current payments. For our
second measure of total compensation, which we later use in Section 5, we add salary,
bonuses, other annual payments as well as the value of exercised and exercisable stock
options to obtain the new measure for total compensation. The valuation of the long-term
components like exercisable stock options is problematic. We choose the simplest method
and value the stock options at 25 percent of their exercise price.7
To construct a dummy variable that is equal to one for females and zero for males, we
exploit two sources of information as the database itself does not include such a variable.
First, some of the individuals are addressed by \Mister" or \Misses" in a variable that
describes their background. With this procedure we can classify about 80% of individuals
in our sample. For those individuals who are addressed by their names only, we use the
¯rst name to decide gender. To classify ¯rst names we rely on name books. When the
¯rst name can either be male or female, such as Carol, we drop the observations.
Firm size can be measured either by sales, assets or the number of employees. For
the regression analysis we use one year lagged sales. Further ¯rm characteristics are the
3-digit industry and a ¯rm's performance, which we measure by the ratio of a ¯rm's one
year lagged market-to-book value relative to that of its 3-digit industry.
OSIRIS further reports the title of each individual. There are a large number of
occupational titles and some of the executives report more than one title. We extract the
main title and construct 12 broad occupational categories: chief executive o±cer/chair
of the board, vice chair, president, director, chief ¯nancial o±cer, chief operating o±cer,
7Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) use the same approach, which can be defended based on simu-
lation results (for example, Lambert et al. 1991 and McConnell 1993) and show that more sophisticated
option pricing models (based on the Black-Scholes or binomial formulas) typically produce values in this
range. They also suggest that even if a potentially more sophisticated method for pricing the options
is used, one would still have no comparable analytical model for valuating accounting-based long-term
incentive plans (performance plans).
5other chief o±cers, executive vice president, senior vice president, group vice president,
vice president and other occupations.
Since some some of these explanatory variables may change over time, we also want
to control for the possibility that changes in these variables are correlated with gender.
Women may move less both across ¯rms and in the hierarchical layer in ¯rms, which can
also be a source of the gender wage gap.8 To control for the ¯rst issue we generate a
dummy variable, change of ¯rm, which takes the value one, if the individual worked in a
di®erent ¯rm in the previous period. We also de¯ne a second dummy variable, change of
title, that takes the value one, if the individual had a di®erent title in the previous period.
Finally, our data source allows us to de¯ne four di®erent dummy variables that re°ect
the university degrees achieved by executives: Bachelor, Masters, MBA, and PhD. One
drawback of OSIRIS concerning the education variables is that for a large fraction of the
sample no degree is reported. We assume these individuals hold at least a bachelor degree,
but de¯ne them as a group of their own.
2.3 Summary statistics
Summary statistics for our sample are detailed in Tables 1-4. We have 16,558 (94.7 per-
cent) male and 932 (5.3 percent) female executives in our sample. Table 1 reports the
mean total compensation for all managers as well as separated by gender. It further re-
ports detailed information on the value of stock options. The mean total compensation
for all managers in our sample is $1,074,415. If we include the value of exercisable stock
options, it is $1,423,008. Basic compensation (salary, bonus and other annual payments)
amounts to 64 percent of total compensation, exercised stock options make up the re-
8We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point. Empirical evidence provided by Olsen and
Becker 1988, Cannings 1988 and Landau 1995 is consistent with this view that a managers's promotion
is in°uenced by gender.
6maining 36 percent. The average total compensation of male managers is $257,665 higher
than the average for female managers. This di®erence of 24 percent is, using a two-sided
t-test, signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The di®erence between male and female man-
agers is larger for our second measure of total compensation (31 percent). It is smaller
for basic compensation (16 percent), salary (12 percent) and bonuses (17 percent). It is
again higher for other annual pay components (47 percent) and for the value of exercised
stock options (41 percent). With the exception of other annual payments, the di®erences
between the various components of compensation are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
Table 1 about here
Table 1 further reports the mean value of exercised, exercisable and unexercisable
stock options. The number of managers who exercised their stock options is much smaller
than the number of managers who hold stock options, which re°ects the declining stock
market in these years.
Table 2 reports summary statistics on the characteristics of companies in our sample.
The average company is quite large with about $1.7 billion in total assets and 5,650 em-
ployees. Female managers tend to be active in slightly smaller companies ($1,700 million
vs. $1,619 million) even though the di®erences in ¯rm size are not signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero and not as large as observed by Bertrand and Hallock (2001), who document
that male managers work in companies which are 40 percent larger than the companies
of female managers.9 Female managers also tend to be active in slightly more success-
9When we compare our sample to the sample Bertrand and Hallock (2001) used in their analysis, we
observe the following di®erences. Their sample contains more observations as their sample includes more
years with a comparable number of observations, whereas the majority of our observations comes from the
years 2003 and 2004. Although their overall sample is larger, our sample contains relatively more ¯rms
and thus also more smaller ¯rms. This might be one reason why the di®erence in ¯rm size between male
and female managers in our sample is not signi¯cant as it is in Bertrand and Hallock (2001)'s sample.
7ful companies even though the di®erences in market-to-book value are not signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero.
Table 2 about here
Table 2 also reports summary statistics on the characteristics of companies of the
sample of managers that exercised their stock options. On average, these ¯rms are larger
and more pro¯table, but there are also no signi¯cant di®erences between male and female
managers.
Table 3 provides summary statistics on occupational segregation. Column (1) reports
the total number of managers in each occupation category. For example, 3,025 of 17,490
(17.3 percent) are chief executive o±cers and chairs of the board, 3,057 (17.5 percent) are
presidents, and 2,779 (15.9 percent) are chief ¯nancial o±cers. Compared to these ¯gures,
the numbers of vice chairs of the board and of chief operating o±cers in the sample are
rather low.
Table 3 about here
Column (2) reports the relative number of female managers in each occupation cat-
egory. Female managers are less likely to reach the better paid positions such as chief
executive o±cers/chair of the board, or president. For example, the relative numbers
of female chief executive o±cers is 2.3 percent, and of presidents is 3.3 percent. Female
managers are more likely to be found in occupations like chief o±cers (¯nancial, operating
and other) or senior vice presidents. This suggests the existence of a so-called glass ceiling
in top corporate jobs. Column (3) reports the ratio between mean occupation wage and
mean market wage. The numbers show that occupations like chief executive o±cer/chair
of the board, or vice chair of the board are higher paid than the average manager. Col-
umn (4) reports the ratio of mean female wage and mean male wage in each occupation.
8It can be observed that on average female managers are paid roughly the same as male
managers in almost all occupations.
Table 4 presents information on three human-capital related characteristics of the
managers in our sample. As before, we present the means of the variables for the full
sample, and then separately for men and women. The average manager in our sample is
about 50 years old. The average female manager is on average three years younger than
the average male manager. On the other hand, the means of the tenure variable suggest
that men and women have approximately the same level of seniority { almost 4 years.
The summary statistics show that women are more likely to have a bachelor degree than
male managers (17.6 vs. 13.3 percent), but are less likely to have a master's degree {
men (5.3 percent) and women (3.6 percent). On the other hand, the fraction of women
with an MBA (9.1 percent) is equal to the fraction of men, and the fraction of men with
a PhD (2.9 percent) is slightly greater than for women (2.4 percent).
Table 4 about here
Table 4 also reports summary statistics for a change of the title and a change of the
¯rm. One source for di®erences in wages might be a promotion within a ¯rm (re°ected by
a change of the title) or a manager's mobility (re°ected by a change of the ¯rm). In our
sample, we ¯nd that 6.6% of managers have changed their title and 0.6% have changes
the ¯rm. There are no signi¯cant di®erences between male and female managers.
3 Estimation results from wage regressions
To analyze the wage gap between male and female managers, we estimate two speci¯-
cations of a Mincer-type wage equation with the logarithm of total compensation as the
dependent variable. In the ¯rst speci¯cation, the explanatory variables are a dummy vari-
9able for gender, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, dummy variables for education,
¯rm size,10 market-to-book value relative to the 3-digit industry as well as 3-digit industry
speci¯c and yearly dummy variables. In the second speci¯cation, we add the change of the
¯rm, occupational dummy variables11 and the change of the title. We report the results
for these two speci¯cations as the later added variables might be endogenous and already
re°ect discrimination. In such a way, we can also measure the e®ect of a \glass ceiling"
on the gender wage di®erence.
We consider a random e®ects estimator, as some of the managers are in the sample up
to four times and others only once. Additionally, we split our sample into managers who
did not exercise their stock options and those who did, to investigate the e®ect of stock
options on the gender wage gap. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 present estimation results
of the two speci¯cations for all managers. Columns (3) and (4) present the results for
managers who did not exercise their stock options, and columns (5) and (6) for managers
who exercised their stock options.
The estimated coe±cient of the female dummy variable in the ¯rst speci¯cation
indicates that the gender pay gap reduces from 24.0 percent in the raw data (implied by
Table 1) to a signi¯cant 15.9 percent. When we additionally control for the change of
the ¯rm, occupational dummy variables and the change of the title, the gender pay gap
further reduces to a signi¯cant 6.0 percent. These results indicate that the gender pay
gap in top corporate jobs is still there and that a large proportion of this gap can be
10Murphy (1999) documents that the level and composition of CEO pay in the US varies systematically
across industries and with company size. According to his study, the best-documented stylized fact
regarding executive compensation is that pay is higher in larger ¯rms. This relationship is typically
measured as the elasticity of compensation to company revenues.
11Studies investigating the gender wage gap frequently notice that occupations where predominantly
women work pay lower wages. Bayard, Kellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1999), for example, have found
such a relationship of gender-speci¯c segregation of jobs and wage di®erences. This suggests the use of
variables that control for individuals' occupation.
10attributed to occupational segregation, i.e. \glass ceiling".
Table 5 about here
The results for other explanatory variables like age, tenure, education, occupational
and industrial segregation are as one can expect for wage equations. The overall e®ect of
age and tenure is positive and higher education partly pays o®.
The impact of ¯rm size and industrial segregation on executive compensation is also
as expected. The estimated coe±cient on the natural logarithm of sales is very close to the
elasticity ¯gures reported by Murphy (1999) for the 1990s and it is highly signi¯cant. A ten
percent increase in ¯rm size implies a 3.0 percent increase in total cash compensation. We
also control both for industrial segregation by including 263 three-digit industry dummy
variables and for any performance e®ects by including the market-to-book ratio relative
to the three-digit industry of each company.
The results with respect to the occupational dummy variables show that chief execu-
tive o±cers earn more than any other manager. The next highest positions are president
and vice chair. As women are less likely to be in these positions then men, part of the
gender wage gap in top corporate positions is explained by occupational segregation.
A change of the ¯rm has no signi¯cant e®ect on wages. We attribute this result to
the relative low number of managers in our sample who have actually moved to another
¯rm. A change of the title has a positive e®ect on wages.
To analyze the e®ect of stock options, we split the sample into managers who did
and who did not exercise their stock options. The results of the ¯rst speci¯cation indicate
a signi¯cant gender gap of 12.9 percent for managers who did not exercise their stock
options and a signi¯cant gender gap of 29.6 percent for managers who exercised them.
When we additionally control for a change of the ¯rm, occupational segregation and a
11change of the title, these numbers reduce to an insigni¯cant 4.6 percent for managers
who did not exercise their stock options and a signi¯cant 14.9 percent for managers who
exercised them. For this particular subsample of managers, who have exercised their stock
options, the gender wage gap is substantially larger than it is in the overall sample.
4 Decomposition of the wage gap
To assess the amount of discrimination in the top corporate jobs, we calculate Blinder-
Oaxaca decompositions.12 We estimate two separate wage equations for male and female
managers and decompose the mean wage di®erence into the di®erence in human capital
endowment and the di®erence in the valuation of human capital across groups of individ-
uals. The ¯rst part is the di®erence of the mean characteristics of both groups evaluated
at the prices male managers receive for these characteristics. The second part is the
di®erence in prices, evaluated at female managers' mean characteristics. This version of
the decomposition is known as the male based decomposition and assumes men to be
paid their marginal product. There is also a female based decomposition which assumes
women to be paid their marginal product. We calculate both, but comment only on the
results of the male based decomposition.
Table 6 reports the decomposition results for all managers. Panel A reports the
results for the ¯rst speci¯cation. The pay di®erence is equal to 0.161. The decomposition
results show that the unexplained part is equal to 0.158 (98.2 percent) and the explained
part is equal to 0.003 (1.8 percent). To evaluate the e®ect of occupational segregation, we
additionally report the decomposition results for the second speci¯cation in Panel B. The
unexplained part is now equal to 0.054 (33.7 percent) and the explained part is now equal
to 0.107 (66.3 percent). These results show that most of the raw di®erence in the gender
12See for example, Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973).
12pay gap can be attributed to occupational segregation. Human capital endowment and
other explanatory variables like industrial segregation do not play an important role. The
remaining part of the raw wage di®erence is due to di®erences in coe±cients that may
re°ect discrimination stemming from other factors than a \glass ceiling".
Table 7 about here
Table 7 reports the decomposition results for managers who exercised their stock
options. Panel A reports the results the ¯rst speci¯cation. The pay di®erence is equal to
0.255. The decomposition results show that the unexplained part is equal to 0.312 (122.4
percent) and the explained part is equal to -0.057 (-22.4 percent). The decomposition
results for the second speci¯cation reported in Panel B show that the unexplained part
is equal to 0.149 (54.3 percent) and the explained part is equal to 0.117 (45.7 percent).
For this subsample, most of the total gap in compensation by gender is due to di®erences
in coe±cients that may re°ect discrimination and occupational segregation is only the
second most important reason.
Table 6 about here
While the results depicted in Table 6 are in line with Bertrand and Hallock (2001), for
the results of the subsample of managers who exercised their stock options this is not true.
Stock options seem to be more vulnerable to discrimination than basic compensation.
5 The e®ect of stock options
To further analyze, whether the e®ect of stock options on the gender wage gap is due to
a less pro¯table trading strategy of female managers or to the size of their stock options,
13we estimate six additional equations. In particular, we compare the number and the
value of exercised and unexercised stock options across male and female managers. The
¯rst equation uses the logarithm of the value of exercised stock options as the dependent
variable and personal, occupational, ¯rm and industry characteristics as well as yearly
dummy variables as independent variables. The second equation uses the logarithm of the
number of exercised stock options as the dependent variable and the same independent
variables as the ¯rst equation. The third and the fourth equations do the same for
unexercised stock options.
We hypothesize that if the estimated coe±cients of the female dummy variable are of
about the same size for the value and the number of stock options then the gender wage
gap is not due to a less pro¯table trading strategy of female managers. This hypothesis
can, of course, only be tested with exercised stock options. We use unexercised stock
options to test whether male and female managers obtain di®erent stock option packages.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 report the results with the logarithm of the value
and number of exercised stock options as dependent variables. Columns (3) and (4) do
so for unexercised stock options. The results show that the coe±cients for the female
dummy variable are roughly the same in all four equations, and that we cannot reject
the hypothesis of unequal treatment with regard to the number of stock options. Thus,
the di®erence in the subsample of managers who exercised their stock options can be
explained by female managers receiving a di®erent number of stock options. This ¯nding
is similar to di®erences in contingent pay observed by Chauvin and Ash (1994).
Table 8 about here
We then run wage regressions with two samples, namely all managers and managers
with exercisable stock options.
14The estimation results, which are reported in columns (5) and (6) of Table 8, show
that the estimated coe±cients of the female dummy variable increases from about 6.0
percent (reported in column (2) of Table 5) to 9.0 and 12.1 percent. That is an increase
of about 50 percent or three percentage points. This indicates that the main two sources
of the gender wage gap are occupational segregation and a di®erent endowment of male
and female managers with stock options.
6 Summary and concluding remarks
We analyzed the pay di®erence between male and female managers of publicly listed US
companies for the years 2000-2004. We found that female managers receive 24.0 percent
less in total compensation (salary, bonus, other payments and exercised stock options)
than their male colleagues. When we correct for personal, occupational, ¯rm and industry
characteristics, the pay di®erence reduces to a signi¯cant 6.0 percent. This is in line with
Bertrand and Hallock (2001), who report a wage gap of 4.0 percent for a similar sample
of top managers over the period 1992-1998, although insigni¯cant.
One source of the gender wage gap is occupational segregation. Our results showed
that the estimated coe±cients of the female dummy variable more than double when
we omit the occupational dummy variables. Decomposition results further showed that
the main part of the gender wage gap can be attributed to occupational segregation, i.e.
\glass ceiling". Human capital endowment and other variables like industrial segregation
do not contribute.
Additionally, we analyzed the e®ect of stock options. To do so, we split the sample
into managers who did not and who did exercise their stock options. For the ¯rst subsam-
ple, we observed an insigni¯cant gender gap of 4.6 percent. For the second subsample, we
observed a signi¯cant gender gap of 14.9 percent. Further regression results showed that
15the di®erence in the value of exercised stock options between male and female managers
is not driven by a less pro¯table trading strategy of women, but by the fact that women
receive on average 18.0 percent fewer stock options. Including also the present discounted
value of exercisable stock options in a new measure of total compensation, the estimated
coe±cients of the female dummy variable increases from about 6.0 to 9.0 percent.
To summarize, our results indicate that occupational segregation and a di®erent
endowment of male and female managers with stock options are the main sources of the
gender wage gap. This indicates that unequal treatment of female managers persists.
It seems that women have not broken the \glass ceiling" nor have they obtained equal
payment, yet.
The international empirical evidence shows that women in general still earn substan-
tially less than men do and that women have been catching up, although at a slow rate.
It seems, however, that female managers in the US have to face the opposite trend. Pay
di®erences across gender were larger for the time period 2000-2004 than they were be-
tween 1992-1998. This increase in the gender pay gap was mainly driven by stock options
and as these are more prevalent in the top management and in larger ¯rms, our results
suggest more discrimination there.
Stock options are assumed to be more performance related than any other compen-
sation component. Recent empirical evidence by Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2006)
shows that the increase in performance related pay has signi¯cantly contributed to the
increase in (male) wage inequality. The authors' basic assumption is that performance
related pay tends to be closer to marginal products than compensation not related to
performance. In the light of their results and assumptions one would then conclude that
unobserved productivity is the reason for the gender wage gap in di®erent endowments
with stock options.
16This reasoning, of course, lets one wonder what are the unobserved characteristics
of female managers that distinguish them from male managers to justify di®erent endow-
ments with stock options. Recent empirical and experimental research tries to point out
such unobserved characteristics that could explain di®erences between male and female
managers. We are going to discuss some of the explanations not only with respect to
wages of top managers but also with respect to occupational segregation.
Experimental research has shown that there are di®erences between women and men
in their selection into competitive environments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2006). Women
shy away from competition even when their abilities would suggest otherwise and men
compete too much given their abilities. Such di®erences can explain a lower number of
female top managers. The same does other empirical evidence which shows that women
are more risk averse then men and thus select into di®erent occupations (DeLeire and
Levy, 2004). Although neither authors draw any conclusions about pay di®erences, a
logical consequence of their results { in the absence of discrimination { should be no or a
positive pay gap between male and female managers, as only the best women will make
it to the top and these are more competitive and risk loving than the average man who
made it to the top.13 Thus, di®erences in these unobserved abilities cannot explain pay
gaps and the even larger pay gap in the higher management. In contrast, they suggest
that discrimination is actually underestimated.
Women, in particular graduating students from business schools, tend to negotiate
their ¯rst salary less e®ectively than their male colleagues do (Babcock, 2002). A wage gap
in the beginning of a career would then typically cumulate to an even wider gap in later
years. And, as negotiating is an integral part of being a manager bad negotiating skills
would re°ect lower productivity. However, there is other experimental evidence that shows
that even though women are less e®ective in negotiating on their own behalf, they are
13See also Bertrand and Hallock (2001, p.17) for an analogous argumentation.
17e®ective negotiators on behalf of their ¯rms or others (Riley, Babcock and McGinn, 2005).
With respect to our results, we would have to conclude that female managers negotiate
better for their ¯xed salaries than for their stock options, or that female managers are
more risk averse. However, in that case we would expect a positive gender wage gap for
¯xed wage components.
Women still do most of the work at home and they are responsible for child care, even
when both they and their partners are employed full-time (Biernat and Wortman, 1991;
Lennon and Rosenfeld, 1994; Robinson, 1998). This reason is often argued to explain
discrimination and the obstinacy of the glass ceiling as men have more leisure time and
more time to recover from work and therefore make better employers. Rational employers
anticipate that and discriminate accordingly (Francois and van Ours, 2000). However,
although female managers obviously earn less than their male colleagues, their salaries
are supposedly still high enough to a®ord professional child care and household help.
Considering these arguments one would conclude that there are no likely explanations
other than discrimination for the gender wage gap between female and male managers
stemming from stock options. Or, coming back to Lemieux, Macleod and Parent (2006)
and their assumption that performance related pay tends to be closer to marginal prod-
ucts than compensation not related to performance, it could be that there is market
power on the side of top managers which is not induced by own negotiating skills or by
other unobserved productivity di®erences. Potential reasons might be male dominated
supervisory boards that discriminate accordingly.
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22A Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics on managers' compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Male Female
Variable managers managers managers p-value
Total compensation
including exercised stock options 1,074,415 1,088,145 830,480 0.0085
(22,007) (23,006) (58,520)
(17,490) (16,558) (932)




Basic compensation 689,273 695,185 584,242 0.0097
(9,637) (10,017) (32,005)
(17,490) (16,558) (932)
Salary 287,204 289,135 252,992 0.0000
(1,485) (1,537) (5,433)
(17,404) (16,474) (930)
Bonus 269,287 271,805 226,486 0.0417
(5,097) (5,312) (16,188)
(12,811) (12,099) (712)




Value of exercised stock options 1440,575 1475,428 862,758 0.0249
(63,296) (66,508) (144,980)
(4,676) (4,410) (266)
Value of exercisable stock options 2040,461 2096,615 1026,191 0.0013
(74,104) (77,902) (117,461)
(11,952) (11,325) (627)
Value of unexercisable stock options 1053,742 1080,742 581,443 0.0047
(39,945) (42,142) (43,159)
(11,373) (10,758) (615)
Table 1 presents summary statistics on compensation of all, male and female managers. It reports sample
means and standard deviations and the number of observations in parentheses. The data are from the
OSIRIS database from Bureau von Dyck for 2000-2004. All (price) data are reported in real 2000 US
Dollar adjusted using the US consumer price index. The p-value in column (4) originates from a two-sided
t-test testing the signi¯cance of the mean di®erence of the respective variable between female and male
managers.
23Table 2: Summary statistics on ¯rm characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Male Female
Variable managers managers managers p-value
All ¯rms
Sales (in 1000 USD) 1,189,294 1,193,456 1115,356 0.4120
(21,381) (22,084) (83,959)
Assets (in 1000 USD) 1,695,901 1,700,224 1,619,104 0.5924
(34,029) (34,986) (146,527)
Number of employees 5,746 5,792 4,920 0.1495
(135) (141) (383)
Market-to-book value -0.0086 -0.0093 0.0045 0.7301
(relative to 3-digit industry) (0.009) (0.009) (0.040)
Number of observations 17,490 16,558 932
Firms of managers exercising stock options
Sales (in 1000 USD) 1794,992 1802,658 1667,892 0.5400
(50,929) (52,625) (201,073)
Assets (in 1000 USD) 2492,367 2490,807 2518,233 0.9347
(77,500) (79,389) (352,350)
Number of employees 9,152 9,230 7,856 0.4236
(397) (418) (884)
Market-to-book value 0.3027 0.3001 0.3455 0.5798
(relative to 3-digit industry) (0.018) (0.019) (0.079)
Number of observations 4,676 4,410 266
Table 2 presents summary statistics of ¯rm characteristics. It reports sample means and standard devia-
tions in parenthesis for all managers and those managers who exercised their stock options. Each sample
is separated into male and female managers. The data are from the OSIRIS database from Bureau von
Dyck for 2000-2004. All (price) data are reported in real 2000 US Dollar adjusted using the US consumer
price index. The p-value in column (4) originates from a two-sided t-test testing the signi¯cance of the
mean di®erence of the respective variable between female and male managers.
24Table 3: Summary statistics on occupational segregation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number % of Occupation/ Female/
in female market male
Variable occupation managers wage wage
Chief executive o±cer/Chair of the board 3,025 0.023 2.016 0.946
Vice chair of the board 287 0.035 1.659 0.734
President 3,057 0.033 1.142 0.870
Director 384 0.031 0.926 1.000
Chief ¯nancial o±cer 2,779 0.062 0.704 0.735
Chief operating o±cer 539 0.065 0.826 1.134
Other chief o±cer 274 0.069 0.542 1.026
Executive vice president 1,573 0.057 0.969 1.134
Senior vice president 1,675 0.075 0.706 0.800
Vice president 2,283 0.075 0.450 1.083
Group vice president 1,389 0.070 0.433 0.897
Number of managers with other titles 225
Number of observations 17,490
Table 3 presents summary statistics on occupational segregation. It reports absolute numbers in each
occupation, the relative number of female managers in each occupation, the ratio between mean occupa-
tion wage and mean market wage and the ratio between mean female wage and mean male wage in each
occupation. The data are from the OSIRIS database from Bureau von Dyck for 2000-2004. All (price)
data are reported in real 2000 US Dollar adjusted using the US consumer price index.
25Table 4: Summary statistics on personal characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Male Female
Variable managers managers managers p-value
Age 50.44683 50.59506 47.8133 0.0000
(0.058) (0.060) (0.224)
Tenure 3.742 3.749 3.613 0.3135
(0.030) (0.031) (0.119)
Education
No information 0.693 0.694 0.673 0.1778
Bachelor 0.136 0.133 0.176 0.0002
Masters 0.052 0.053 0.036 0.0243
MBA 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.9396
PhD 0.029 0.029 0.024 0.3333
Promotion
Change of title 0.0661 0.0658 0.0719 0.4644
Change of ¯rm 0.0063 0.0063 0.0076 0.6455
Number of observations 17,490 16,558 932
Table 4 presents summary statistics on personal characteristics of all, male and female managers. It
reports sample means and standard deviations in parenthesis. The data are from the OSIRIS database
from Bureau von Dyck for 2000-2004. All (price) data are reported in real 2000 US Dollar adjusted using
the US consumer price index. The p-value in column (4) originates from a two-sided t-test testing the






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 6: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results for all managers
Total Unexplained Explained
Decomposition wage gap wage gap wage gap
Panel A.
Speci¯cation without occupational dummy variables
Male based decomposition 0.161 0.158 0.003
98.2% 1.8%
Female based decomposition 0.161 0.199 -0.038
123.6% -23.6%
Panel B.
Speci¯cation with occupational dummy variables
Male based decomposition 0.161 0.054 0.107
33.7% 66.3%
Female based decomposition 0.161 0.100 0.061
62.1% 37.9%
Table 6 presents Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results based on separate wage regressions for male and
female managers. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total compensation. In Panel A, the
explanatory variables are a dummy variable for gender, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, dummy
variables for education, ¯rm size, market-to-book value relative to the 3-digit industry, yearly and 3-digit
industry speci¯c dummy variables. In Panel B, the explanatory variables are a dummy variable for gender,
age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, dummy variables for education, ¯rm size, market-to-book value
relative to the 3-digit industry, yearly and 3-digit industry speci¯c dummy variables as well as the change
of the ¯rm, occupational dummy variables and the change of the title. The data are from the OSIRIS
database from Bureau von Dyck for 2000-2004. All (price) data are in real 2000 US Dollar adjusted using
the US consumer price index.
30Table 7: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results for managers exercising stock options
Total Unexplained Explained
Decomposition wage gap wage gap wage gap
Panel A.
Speci¯cation without occupational dummy variables
Male based decomposition 0.255 0.312 -0.057
122.4% -22.4%
Female based decomposition 0.255 0.529 -0.273
207.1% -107.1%
Panel B.
Speci¯cation with occupational dummy variables
Male based decomposition 0.255 0.139 0.117
54.3% 45.7%
Female based decomposition 0.255 0.418 -0.163
163.9% -63.9%
Table 6 presents Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results based on separate wage regressions for male and
female managers exercising stock options. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total compensation.
In Panel A, the explanatory variables are a dummy variable for gender, age, age squared, tenure, tenure
squared, dummy variables for education, ¯rm size, market-to-book value relative to the 3-digit industry,
yearly and 3-digit industry speci¯c dummy variables. In Panel B, the explanatory variables are a dummy
variable for gender, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, dummy variables for education, ¯rm size,
market-to-book value relative to the 3-digit industry, yearly and 3-digit industry speci¯c dummy variables
as well as the change of the ¯rm, occupational dummy variables and the change of the title. The data
are from the OSIRIS database from Bureau von Dyck for 2000-2004. All (price) data are in real 2000 US
Dollar adjusted using the US consumer price index.
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r
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h
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i
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u
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c
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f
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